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Several theories of firm performance can explain the well-known observation that survival 
is positively related to age. However, a more mundane explanation – selection bias driven 
by variations in firm quality – may also underlie the phenomenon. This paper employs a 
90-year plant-level panel data set on the US iron and steel shipbuilding industry of the 19
th 
and early 20
th centuries to discriminate between the two explanations. The shipbuilding 
industry exhibits the usual joint dependency of survival on age and size, but this depend-
ency is eliminated after controlling for heterogeneity by using pre-entry experience as a 
proxy for firm quality. The evidence points to a dominant role for selection bias in creat-
ing the age-dependency of survival. At the same time, pre-entry experience is found to 
have a large and extremely persistent effect on survival, and this finding is inconsistent 
with standard explanations for the role of pre-entry experience on firm performance.  
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 I. Introduction 
  One of the most prominent empirical regularities to emerge in industrial or-
ganization is the age dependency of firm survival. The relationship has been ob-
served in large multi-industry samples constructed from manufacturing censuses 
in several countries, as well as in numerous specialized samples.
1 Importantly, 
because age and size are positively correlated among surviving firms, and size and 
survival are positively correlated, the age-dependency of exit is robust to control-
ling for firm size.
2  
  The relationship is an attractive target for modelers. Because age-dependency 
is an intriguing and challenging regularity to explain, we have come to expect 
that models able to do so will be revealing about the way industries evolve. A 
number of competing explanations now exist, but they all exploit the idea that 
age serves as a proxy for an omitted variable. First, firms may accumulate 
knowledge over time, through learning by doing or as the outcome of an active 
research program. Knowledge reduces the exit hazard but it is unobservable to 
the econometrician, so age appears to reduce directly the exit hazard. Second, 
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) construct a model in which financial market frictions 
induce variations in the debt-equity ratio that are correlated with age, that affect 
the survival rate, and that have not to date been included in hazard regressions.
3 
Third, Klepper and Thompson (2002) construct a model in which industries are 
composed of distinct, but intrinsically unobservable, submarkets. Firm survival is 
increasing in the number of submarkets in which a firm is active and this number 
                                                           
1 Studies using census data include Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, 1989; US), Disney, Has-
kel and Heden (2000; UK), Baldwin et al. (2000; Canada), and Persson (2002; Sweden). Evans 
(1987a, 1987b) and Hall (1987) report similar results using Dun and Bradstreet data and 
Compustat data respectively. For more specialized samples, see Audretsch (1991), Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995), Baldwin and Gorecki (1991), Mata and Portugal (1994), and Wagner (1994). 
2 And thus models in which size is a sufficient statistic for exit are inconsistent with the evidence. 
3 Clementi and Hopenhayn (2002) have shown that such financial market frictions are efficient in 
the presence of moral hazard.  
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is in turn correlated with age.
 4 
  However, there could be a more mundane explanation for the age-dependency 
of survival. It is well-known that unobserved heterogeneity in the exit hazard in-
duces the appearance of age effects on survival. As a cohort of firms ages, the risk 
set becomes increasingly composed of firms with the lowest propensity to exit. 
The mean exit rate for the cohort therefore declines with cohort age, even if the 
exit hazard does not decline with age for any individual firm.  
  If age-dependency can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity, the regular-
ity would turn out to be rather unrevealing. After all, no one expects all firms to 
be equally capable, and discovering that they are not teaches us little. We would 
therefore like to be able to discriminate between these competing classes of ex-
planations. This paper presents the results of a particularly simple test, using a 
new panel data set on plant-level output in the US iron and steel merchant ship-
building industry, covering the period 1825 to 1914. These output data are com-
bined with proxies for firm quality, constructed from extensive textual records, 
that predict the propensity to exit. I show first that the familiar size-conditional 
age-dependency of exit is present in the data. I then ask whether the addition of 
the quality proxies to the hazard regression eliminates the age-dependency of the 
hazard. The answer is that it does: after conditioning on firm type the hazard is 
independent of age. The results therefore imply that the initial age-dependency 
can be explained by selection bias.  
  This paper uses data on firms’ pre-entry experience as a proxy for firm qual-
ity. The results clearly show that the effects of pre-entry experience do not decay 
even over a very long horizon, and they are not diminished by controlling for 
size. We have long known that firms and entrepreneurs with prior experience 
closely related to their new venture survive much longer than those without rele-
                                                           
4 Conventional wisdom is that Jovanovic’s (1982) selection model was the first to predict a positive 
relationship between age and survival, but this interpretation is incorrect. In Jovanovic, the exit 




5 and there is now emerging a body of evidence that the pre-
entry experience of a firm or its founders has extremely persistent effects.
6 These 
regularities by themselves may reflect nothing more than hysteresis effects from 
dynamic scale economies. However, the new finding in this paper that pre-entry 
experience effects show no tendency to diminish over long periods of time even 
after controlling for size is inconsistent with the standard rationalizations for the 
role of pre-entry experience. Theories that can explain this remarkable effect of 
pre-entry experience may well be revealing about the way industries evolve.   
II. Notes on Iron and Steel Shipbuilding 
  Shipbuilding is an ancient industry, and one of the oldest in America. The 
first ship built in the English colonies, a 30-ton vessel called the Virginia, was 
launched on the Kennebec River in 1607. In the ensuing decades numerous 
coastal and fishing vessels were built, and by the end of the 17
th century centers 
of activity had been established in Maine, Massachusetts, and on the Delaware. 
By the end of the revolutionary war, output had reached 35,000 tons annually  
                                                           
5 Lane (1989; ATM machines), Mitchell (1991; diagnostic imaging), Carroll et al. (1996; autos), and 
Klepper and Simons (2000; televisions) show that diversifying firms with experience in related fields 
perform better along a variety of dimensions than less experienced entrants. Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988) find that diversifying firms survive longer and grow faster than de novo entrants. 
Sleeper (1998; lasers), Klepper and Sleeper (2001; lasers) and Walsh, Kirchhoff and Boylan (1996; 
semiconductor silicon) report that spin-offs survive longer than other startups, and Klepper (2002b; 
autos) further shows that the quality of a spin-off’s parent matters. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1990; semiconductors) report that firm performance is increasing in the industry experience of 
their founding teams. Helfat and Lieberman (2002) have a helpful review of the literature. 
6 See Carroll et al. (1996), Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2002), Klepper (2002a, 2002b, 2003), and 
Klepper and Simons (2000). Their findings resonate with Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2001) observa-
tion that something about the firms that went public during the 1920s (which the authors attribute 
quite generically to firm quality and label “organization capital”) has served them well enough to 
account for greater stock market capitalization than real cumulative investment would have pre-
dicted, even to the present day.   
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(Hutchins, 1948). In the first half of the 19
th century, output fluctuated around 
100,000 tons per year, until a dramatic rise in the 1850s associated with expand-
ing trade increased output to almost 600,000 tons in 1855 (see Figure 1). 
  Only a tiny fraction of this output consisted of metal-hulled vessels. The first 
iron-hulled vessel, a minnow of 14 tons named Codorus, was launched in 1825 in 
York, PA. Although it undertook a widely-reported journey up the Susquehanna 
River as far as Binghamton, it failed to stimulate additional efforts. Over the 
next thirteen years, a couple of small experimental vessels were launched, and 
several iron steamboats were imported from England and employed with some 
success in the cotton trade on the Savannah River (Brown, 1951). The year 1838 
marks something of a transition. In that year, the West Point Foundry Associa-
tion of Cold Point, NY, built a steam catamaran, the United States. At 222 tons, 
it was far larger than any iron vessel previously built in the US, a significant ad-
vance on the state of the art, and was still in service 22 years later. More notable, 
perhaps, it was the first boat constructed by a firm that was eventually to launch 
more than one vessel, and the first to be launched by a firm of substantial size 
and identifiably relevant expertise. West Point’s entry was followed in fairly 
short order by firms that were to undertake substantial production during their 
lives, including the Phoenix Foundry (founded in 1842), Harlan & Hollingsworth 
(1844), and Neafie, Levy & Co. (1844).  
  Nonetheless, as Figure 1 illustrates, iron shipbuilding did not amount to much 
until the last quarter of the 19
th century. In the 50 years to 1874, only 61 firms 
entered the industry. Of these, 48 firms had abandoned production by 1875, only 
two of them having launched more than ten vessels. A mere 560 vessels had been 
launched and, with a total capacity of 300,962 gross tons, iron shipbuilding ac-
counted for less than three percent of total shipbuilding. Average vessel size, at 
just 536 tons, had also remained modest, and only two vessels exceeding 5,000 
tons had been launched. These numbers stand in stark contrast to their counter-
parts for the forty-year period 1875-1914, during which time 212 producers en- 
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tered, and 3,550 vessels with an average capacity of 1,729 tons were launched for 
a total of over 6.14 million tons, including 346 ships exceeding 5,000 tons (see 
Figures 2 and 3). By the end of this period, metal had fully supplanted wood as 
the material of choice, and vessels were being built of a size far in excess of any-
thing ever launched by wood shipbuilders. 
  In some key respects, the evolution of the metal shipbuilding industry is quite 
typical of nineteenth century industries. It began slowly, with considerable ex-
perimentation, and initially occupied niches in the market. In particular, the shal-
low drafts of iron boats made them especially attractive on the western and At-
lantic rivers.
7 Eventually, however, several factors converged to enable metal 
shipbuilding almost completely to displace wooden shipbuilding. First, increasing 
                                                           
7 It should be recalled that the western rivers were largely shallow rivers until the spread of dams 
late in the nineteenth century. The voyage of the Codorus up the Susquehanna River, which at 






















FIGURE  1.  Production by hull type, 1825-1914, excluding barges.
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FIGURE 2. Iron and steel vessels launched by private yards, 1825-1914.  
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industrialization around the Great Lakes and expanding overseas trade created a 
demand for vessels of a size exceeding the technical limits of wood hulls. Second, 
the substitution of metal for wood hulls in smaller vessels employed on the rivers 
and in the coastal trade accelerated as wood became increasingly scarce and de-
clined in quality at the same time that iron, and subsequently steel, increased 
both in supply and quality. Third, technological advances, particularly in the 
automation of riveting, in the ability to produce large steel plates, and in engine 
design, made the construction of large vessels feasible (Hutchins, 1948). Finally, 
the increasing sophistication of financial markets provided the necessary capital. 
  In other respects, however, the evolution of shipbuilding was less typical. A 
common, although not universal, feature of industry evolution is that output 
grows at a declining rate. As Figure 2 shows, this was not the case for shipbuild-
ing. Many industries also experience a shakeout, in which the number of firms 
declines precipitously without a corresponding decline in output. This was also 
not the experience in shipbuilding. Figure 4 shows that the total number of ac-
tive firms increased almost monotonically over the sample period, with no spike 
in exit or decline in entry.  
  It is easy to understand why shipbuilding did not experience a shakeout. Ge-
ography played an important role. For example, vessels as large as those that be-
gan to be employed on the Great Lakes at the end of the nineteenth century 
could neither leave nor enter the Great Lakes system at that time;
8 shallow draft 
vessels designed for the western rivers were not seaworthy enough to be built on 
the coast and sailed to the rivers; and the Panama Canal did not exist for most 
                                                           
8 The USS Michigan, intended for service on Lake Erie, was the US navy’s first iron-hulled gun-
boat. The vessel was erected in downtown Pittsburgh in 1843 to exploit local expertise in iron work 
and engine building, but had to be dismantled for transportation to Lake Erie and re-erected there. 
(Ballard, 1995). During World War I, Benjamin Cowles, a Buffalo, NY, shipbuilder, made a good 
living cutting ships in half to transport them from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic. Upon repairing 
them, he sold them for Atlantic operations (from typescript notes kindly provided by the Lower 
Lakes Historical Society). The St. Lawrence Seaway did not open until 1959.  
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of the sample period. Consequently, firms located near their markets and produc-
tion was scattered widely throughout the Great Lakes, on the rivers, and on both 
seaboards. 
  Within geographic markets, capacity constraints prevented concentration of 
output. Building in iron required considerable capital and the construction of 
specialized buildings to house machinery.
9 An iron or steel shipbuilder, once es-
tablished, was more or less immobile, and often faced insurmountable obstacles to 
expansion. So iron shipbuilders found themselves very much tied to the locational 
decisions they had initially made. How deep was the water? How wide was the 
waterfront? How many vessels could be accommodated at one time? How large 
                                                           
9  Cramp (1902) points out that the large Philadelphia yard of William Cramp & Sons owned a 
single derrick costing $30,000 the value of which was "considerably greater than that of William 
Cramp’s entire ship-yard sixty years ago. . . which was not then surpassed by any other ship-yard 



























FIGURE 4. Annual Entry and Exit. Entrants are recorded as the first year
in which a vessel is launched. Exits are recorded the year after their last
vessel is launched.  
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could these vessels be? These were not constraints that could easily be changed, 
and the specificity of capital made it costly and unattractive for firms to relocate. 
In fact, between 1825 and 1914 only two firms did
10 and, with the exception of 
two shipbuilding trusts formed at the turn of the century that brought together 
existing yards, only three firms opened multiple yards. It is not surprising that 
even among firms that survived a long period of time, what they did at the out-
set colored their activities forever.  
  Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the consequences of these constraints. As we have 
seen, average vessel size increased dramatically in the late 19
th century, but early 
entrants generally did not participate in the secular rise in vessel size. Figure 5 
shows that as the increase in average vessel size began to accelerate in the 1880s 
the average size of vessels launched by the most successful and long-lived pre-
1860 entrants remained unchanged. Their survival was predicated on the continu-
ing and growing demand for smaller vessels evident in Figure 3. Figure 6 plots 
annual numbers of vessels launched for two of the most successful producers in 
Philadelphia (charts for other successful firms are similar). Within a fairly short 
period of time, each firm was producing at much the same rate of output that it 
would see for the rest of its long career, and no trend in output is visible. The 
contrast with other major industries at the turn of the century,  such as automo-
biles, where firm success was typically associated with significant growth and in-
novation, is notable. 
  As even successful firms failed to grow and exploit the new market opportuni-
ties presented by the demand for larger vessels, the new markets 
 
                                                           
10  The Cleveland Ship Building Company moved its yard from Cleveland to Lorain in 1898, to 
facilitate expansion. The Racine Boat Manufacturing Company relocated from Racine, WI to Mus-
kegon, MI in 1904. Although Racine newspapers had been speculating about the move for some 
time, it did not take place until a disastrous fire destroyed the yard, the landowner refused to re-
new the lease, and Muskegon offered free land, tax breaks and $20,000 in cash (Gunther, 1989; 
Wheeler, 1998).  
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FIGURE 5. Average size of vessels launched by year. Shown separately for
all firms, and for firms with entry date prior to 1860.  
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emerging in the shipbuilding industry had to be met by entrants whose yards 
could be purpose-built to handle the new ships. Several of these late entrants – 
Bath Iron  Works, New York Ship, Newport News, American Shipbuilding -- spe-
cialized in the construction of large ships exceeding 5,000 tons and would survive 
to become the major US shipbuilders of the latter half of the 20
th century. In the 
process, they leave the casual observer with the impression that the typical yard 
of 1900 was an industrial massif owned by a corporate giant. But the impression 
is misleading. In fact, there remained to be filled a growing demand for small ves-
sels, which existing yards were no more able to fill than they were to produce 
large ships. Consequently, the typical entrant in the latter half of the century 
looked much like its earlier counterparts. 
III. Data 
  Since 1789, US law has required that all vessels exceeding 20 gross tons capac-
ity be registered with the government. The registration documents contain basic 
technical details about each vessel but have always been of limited value to re-
searchers because they are scattered, incomplete, and, above all, they do not re-
cord the builder. This study takes as a starting point a fortunate find in the Na-
tional Archives (Bureau of Navigation, c.1920). Around 1920, William Lytle, an 
employee of the Bureau of Navigation with a penchant for making lists, con-
structed a record of metal vessels built in the United States since 1825. The reg-
ister, a hand-written leather-bound volume, is based on official documents but, 
remarkably in view of the work it must have entailed, the register also lists the 
builder for most of the vessels. The register is not quite a finished product. A 
large number of early vessels were omitted entirely, others were not assigned to 
builders, and others were incorrectly assigned. Corrections were made using di-
verse sources, especially Brown (1951) and typescript vessel lists held in various 
specialized manuscript collections. A more extensive omission is that the register  
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reports only merchant vessels. Vessels built by private companies for the U.S. 
Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Navy were added from offi-
cial records provided in Bauer and Roberts (1991), Benham and Hall (1913), 
Canney (1993, 1995, 1998), Conway (1979), Still (1996), and US Coast Guard 
(1989).  
  The sample analyzed in this paper was restricted to producers who launched 
at least one vessel in excess of the 20 gross tons capacity required to trigger regis-
tration.
11 However, in order to track more precisely the dates of activity of the 
included firms, the sample includes all metal vessels known to have been pro-
duced by the firms, regardless of gross tonnage. The restricted sample contains 
technological details of exactly 4,000 vessels constructed by 273 producers. Figure 
7 compares the number of vessels for which I have information with the US De-
partment of Commerce's (USDC) official tally of metal vessels built during the 
period. To facilitate comparison with the USDC tally, the figure excludes military 
vessels in the sample, all vessels under 20 gross tons capacity, and all vessels for 
which no gross tonnage is available, leaving a count of 3,482 vessels. The USDC 
tally reports 3,222 documented merchant vessels, missing 260 merchant vessels 
that should have been included. I believe that, subject to the minimum size re-
quirement, the database is the most complete record in existence of metal ship-
building in the United States prior to 1915.  
  The only major omissions that I am aware of are vessels constructed for ex-
port, and which therefore were not documented in the United States. Few firms 
exported vessels and, for most of those that did, export activity formed a minor 
part of their total production. There are a couple of exceptions, however. Be-
tween 1878 and 1914, James Rees and Sons of Pittsburgh, PA, produced hun-
dreds of knock-down iron and steel steamboats for service on South American 
                                                           
11 Not all of the vessels in the database were registered, and some of those that were registered were 
not required to be. Fifty-seven builders, accounting for 114 boats, were excluded by the minimum 




rivers (Rees and Sons, 1913), but only fourteen of their vessels are recorded in 
the United States. Marine Iron Works of Chicago, IL, also sold an unknown 
number of knock-down iron vessels to South America, although in their case the 
majority of their export trade consisted of the sale of machinery along with plans 
for wooden hulls to be built locally (Marine Iron Works, 1902). 
   To supplement the panel data on vessels, detailed textual histories have been 
produced for as many of the 273 recorded producers as possible. For some small 
producers, I have no information at all, while for others I have identified their 
pre-entry backgrounds only from city directories indicating their profession prior 
to entry. For most large producers, in contrast, extremely rich histories are avail-
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  This study   U.S. Department of Commerce
FIGURE 7. Metal Vessels Launched for Civilian Use, 1825-1914. Department of
Commerce records allocate production vessels to year of registration or enroll-
ment, whereas the data set allocates vessels to year of launching. These dates
coincide in the majority of cases. Source for USDC data: Smith and Brown (1948,
Table 6).   
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dustry. The median producer lies between these extremes, and brief textual histo-
ries were constructed from a variety of sources, including manuscript records, 
county histories, obituaries, genealogical records, and (on several occasions) from 
information kindly provided by descendents of the shipbuilders. Further discus-
sion of the data, especially of coding decisions made in the translation from tex-
tual firm histories to sample data, can be found in a companion paper (Thomp-
son, 2004). 
  Coding of the pre-entry backgrounds of shipbuilders was concerned primarily 
with distinguishing firms or founders of firms that entered after gaining experi-
ence in manufacturing iron- and steel-hulled vessels, wood-hulled vessels or en-
gines from those that entered with different backgrounds. Entrants with prior 
experience of vessel construction were experienced in hull design and marketing 
vessels, and had often earned a solid reputation for quality and reliability among 
vessel buyers. Firms with pre-entry experience in engine manufacturing were 
likely to be particularly technically competent, despite lacking direct experience 
in hull construction. In fact many shipbuilders, particularly builders of wooden 
vessels, were not equipped to manufacture engines and, although many operated 
small foundries to manufacture custom iron fittings, the normal practice was to 
sub-contract the major machinery to specialists. These indicators of relevant ex-
perience are compared with three other categories: firms whose pre-entry experi-
ence consisted of foundry work; firms with diverse pre-entry experiences including 
shipping, dredging, construction, railroads, rail car manufacturing, naval engi-
neering, and iron milling; and firms whose pre-entry experience is not known.  
  Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the sample. Entrants that had 
previously been involved in shipbuilding or engine manufacturing are combined 
into a single variable, EXPERIENCED, and these firms are compared with others 
that had neither of these backgrounds. Of the 273 firms in the sample, 122 belong 
to the EXPERIENCED group, 48 had previously operated a FOUNDRY without hav-
ing ventured into engine manufacturing, 50 are classified with prior experience in  
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a range of MISCELLANEOUS fields, and 70 have UNKNOWN pre-entry back-
grounds. The mean entry year for each group of firms is within five years of the 
overall sample mean, and the ranges and standard deviations are similar across 




Entry Year, Life, and Entry Size, by Prior Experience 
  SOURCE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE 






  UNKNOWN 
Number of Firms  273 122  48  50  70 
Entry Year:        
   MEAN  1889  1884 1886 1889 1894 
   MIN  1825  1825 1842 1844 1835 
   MAX  1914  1914 1914 1914 1914 
   STD. DEV  20.4  21.7 20.1 20.4 17.3 
Duration (years):        
   MEAN 10.2  15.4  6.1  12.2  2.4 
   MIN  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
   MAX 110.5  92.5  57.5  110.5  21.5 
   STD. DEV  18.3  19.9 10.8 23.5  4.4 
I use the first year in which a metal vessel was launched to mark a firm's entry, and the last year
a vessel was launched, plus 0.5 (to avoid simultaneous entry and exit), to denote its time of exit.
For firms with an unknown exit date after 1914, I code 1914 as the censoring year. 
a Shipbuilding
or engine manufacturing. 
b Firms in this class include some also listed under Miscellaneous. 
c In-




  There are, however, significant differences across categories in survival and 
characteristics at entry. Experienced firms survived on average 15.4 years, longer 
than any other group. In contrast, foundry owners, the group with the least 
amount of recorded relevant experience, survived on average only 6.1 years. The  
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diverse group of firms classified with miscellaneous backgrounds, comprising ex-
periences in shipping, construction, and railroads among others, predictably fall 
between the two previous groups, with an average life of 12.2 years. 
  Inevitably, firms for which I have been able to code backgrounds are much 
more likely to be among the successful, the significant, or the strange. In the ab-
sence of further information, I take the crude approach of creating a category 
UNKNOWN, and run analyses both with this category and after excluding all firms 
with unknown backgrounds. However, the differences between survival rates of 
coded and uncoded firms are sufficiently large to raise the possibility that any 
measured effects of experience are biased upwards by the missing data. Fortu-
nately, pre-entry experience is the only variable missing for these firms, and it is 
feasible to use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the potential effects of miss-
ing data. As I shall show later, the key results handily survive the simulation ex-
ercise. 
IV. Results 
  The results are reported in four sections. If pre-entry experience serves as a 
proxy for firm quality, and if it to be capable of inducing spurious conditional age 
effects on survival, there must be a large and lasting effect of experience. Section 
A explores whether pre-entry experience meets these demands. Using a paramet-
ric hazard model that does not condition on quality, Section B shows that the 
data exhibit the usual joint effects of size and age on survival. Section C then 
shows that the introduction of the quality proxies eliminates the large and sig-
nificant effect of age previously found. Finally, Section D reports results from the 
Monte Carlo simulations.   
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A. The magnitude and persistence of prior experience effects 
  Table 2 reports the results of four Cox proportional hazard regressions of the 
form 
 
ln (, , , ) ()
it x
it htx gte
β βλ = , 
where g(t) is a baseline hazard with unspecified form, xit is the vector of covari-
ates for firm i at age t, and β is vector of hazard ratios for the covariates. A haz-
ard ratio of one indicates that the corresponding covariate has no effect on the 
baseline hazard. A coefficient less (greater) than one indicates that an increase in 
the value of the covariate lowers (raises) the exit hazard.  
  Columns 1 and 3 report the results with right-censoring of observations at 
2001.
12 Column 1 excludes the 70 firms with unknown pre-entry backgrounds, 
while column 3 includes them. The baseline hazard is calculated for firms with 
foundry experience only, and the coefficient estimates reflect that their perform-
ance differs substantially from other experience groups. All regressions include 
controls for location and year of entry, the coefficients of which (not reported) do 
not suggest any noteworthy patterns.
13 
  The key result is the estimated hazard ratio for firms with pre-entry experi-
ence in shipbuilding or engine manufacturing.
14 Column (1) returns a ratio for 
EXPERIENCE of 0.47. Entry with relevant experience reduces the hazard rate 
upon entry by about one half relative to the baseline. However, the significant 
                                                           
12 Although output data are available only through 1914, firm survival is observed to the present 
day. 
13  The location dummies allocate production to four regions: the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the Pa-
cific coast, the Great Lakes, and the western rivers. Five time dummies distinguish entrants before 
1861 and in each decade thereafter. Alternative specifications tried for the location and time dum-
mies had no impact on the results.  
14 As one would expect, the hazard ratio for firms with unknown backgrounds, when these are in-
cluded in the sample, is large. The ratio for the diverse firms categorized into MISCELLANEOUS does 
not differ significantly from one.  
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coefficient of 1.042 on the EXPERIENCE x AGE interaction indicates that the ef-
fect of pre-entry experience is not persistent. Each year of post-entry experience 
raises the hazard ratio for experienced firms by 4.2 percent. Thus, after ten years 
the hazard ratio for EXPERIENCE has risen to 0.69, while the effect of pre-entry 
experience is eliminated entirely after eighteen years of post-entry experience. 
These results are replicated in column (3), which includes the 70 firms whose 




Hazard Ratios  from Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
UNKNOWN BACKGROUNDS:  EXCLUDED   INCLUDED 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
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TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY  2
12 χ =3.9
  2
12 χ =7.1    2
14 χ =4.2
  2
14 χ =7.4 
NUMBER OF YARDS 203  203    273 273 
NUMBER OF FAILURES 173  167    236 230 




are the hazard ratios for three location dummies and five time dummies. Tests on the
proportionality assumption are as implemented in Stata-SE, version 8, with a logarithmic
transformation of the time scale.  
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  It turns out that the apparent decay of experience effects indicated in columns 
(1) and (3) is due entirely to a modest number of firms that survived through 
World War II, some of which continued operations for many years after.
15 Col-
umns (2) and (4) repeat the analysis after censoring all observations at 1945. Do-
ing so eliminates entirely the slow decay of the experience effect. As columns (2) 
and (4) indicate, the hazard ratio for experienced firms is still about one half that 
of inexperienced firms, but there is now no evidence that the effect decays with 
time.  
  It is certainly no surprise that the enormous changes experienced by the in-
dustry during the war years should undermine the effects of experience obtained 
at least 35 years previously.
 16 But until the war, experienced firms have a persis-
tently lower hazard than inexperienced firms. Although the sample contains only 
firms that entered by 1914, there is no evidence that the effects of experience de-
cline before the onset of World War II.   
B. Size, age and survival without conditioning on quality 
  It is useful to explore the joint effects of size and age within the framework of 
a fully parametric model. The logarithm of the baseline survival curve from the 
proportional hazards model of Table 2, column (1), is plotted in Figure 8. The 
curve is convex, consistent with a hazard declining monotonically with respect to 
firm age. Thus, a Weibull hazard model may provide an acceptable parametric 
representation. The remainder of the analysis is therefore based on hazard func-
                                                           
15 The firms are (dates of operation in parentheses): American Shipbuilding's Lorain yard 
(1899−1985), American Shipbuilding's Buffalo yard (1900−1962), Dubuque Boat and Boiler Works 
(1905−1972), Charles Seabury and Co. (1893−1955), Pusey and Jones (1854−1946), Bath Iron 
Works (1905−) Great Lakes Towing Co. (1907−), and Newport News (1891−). 
16 Lane (1951), the official history of the wartime shipbuilding program, provides extensive details 
of the unique conditions brought about by the demands of war production. In particular, yards 
with significant structures and equipment paid for by the government were able to secure owner-
ship of this capital on extremely favorable terms after the war.   
 
20
tions taking the form 
 
ln (, , , ) ( 1 )
it x
it htx te
β λ βλ λ =+ , 
where λ has a useful interpretation as an elasticity: it measures the percentage 
change in the hazard induced by a one-percent increment to age.   
  The first column of Table 3 includes current output, measured by the number 
of vessels launched each year, as the only covariate. Size is negatively related to 
the exit hazard. Each one unit increment to output reduces the exit hazard by 
about 7.5 percent so that a yard launching, for example, five vessels is about 33 
percent more likely to survive the next year than one launching a single vessel.  


























FIGURE 8. Log survival rates. Baseline hazards from column (1) of Table
2. The symbols indicate the baseline hazard corresponding to each ob-
served failure time. The curve is a cubic spline fitted through these
points. The baseline corresponds to a firm entering in 1859 on the Atlan-
tic coast with prior experience in foundry work.  
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significant –0.25, indicating that increases in firm age induce a marked reduction 
in the hazard. That is, the shipbuilding industry exhibits the familiar dependence 
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  LN L  −453.7  −443.4  −439.0  −442.8 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*=10%, 
**=5%, 
***=1%. All regressions in-
clude the location and time indicators given in footnote 13. 
 
 
  The strong effect of age reported in column (1) may exaggerate its true role if 
size is poorly measured. Yards produced vessels in small numbers and the num-
ber of contracts won could vary markedly from year to year. Consequently, out-
put in the current calendar year may be a rather poor measure of effective size. 
Column (2) attempts to smooth out these large variations in annual output rates 
with an alternative measure of firm activity, denoted SCALE, which measures for  
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each year the average annual rate of output since entry. On the basis of the log 
likelihood, this variable explains rather more than current output. Moreover, al-
though current output and SCALE have the same units of measurement, the haz-
ard ratio on SCALE is much smaller: a firm with an average annual rate of output 
of, say, three instead of two vessels, faces a 30 percent lower hazard. As expected, 
the age effect is reduced, but it remains economically important and statistically 
significant. 
  Finally, columns (3) and (4) introduce further controls for size. In column (3), 
market share (simply firm annual output divided by industry output) and indus-
try output are added. In column (4), each output measure is replaced with data 
on gross tonnage launched rather than numbers of vessels launched. In both cases 
the (size-conditional) age-dependency of firm survival remains strong and signifi-
cant.
17  
C. Effects of quality on the relationship between age, size and survival 
  It has been shown so far that (i) pre-entry experience has large and persistent 
effects on survival, and therefore meets the minimal demands for a meaningful 
proxy for firm quality; (ii) the industry exhibits the familiar size-conditional age-
dependency of survival that has appeared in so many previous studies. This sec-
tion addresses two questions: 
• Is the first result robust to the inclusion of controls for firm size 
(thereby eliminating the possibility that experience effects are due to 
hysteresis)? 
• Is the second result robust to the inclusion of proxies for quality? 
  The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Column (1) of Table 4 combines 
                                                           
17 The inclusion of two measures for firm size, plus one for industry size may simply help to pick up 
nonlinearity in the size-survival relationship. This is consistent with the hazard ratio for market 
share exceeding unity. If market share is the sole size control, its hazard ratio is less than one.   
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the three size variables from column (3) of Table 3 with the experience indicator 
variables. On the first question, note that the point estimates for the hazard ra-
tios on EXPERIENCED and MISCELLANEOUS are essentially unchanged from those 
obtained under the Cox proportional hazards specification, even though the re-
gression now has several controls for size. Even after conditioning on age, size, 
location, and entry period, the exit hazard of firms with prior experience in ship-
building or engine manufacturing is about half the hazard for firms with prior 
experience in foundry work. On the second question, note that the elasticity of 
the hazard with respect to age has declined by half to a statistically insignificant 
–0.05. That is, about fifty percent of the hazard reduction initially attributed to 
age is explained by the fixed measures of heterogeneity. Selection bias induced by 
the early failure of low-quality firms is clearly important, while models based on 
unobserved variables correlated with age do not seem to be. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that unobserved heterogeneity continues to exist within experience groups, 
this estimate of the dominant role of selection bias must be a lower bound.  
  The remaining columns in Table 4, and Table 5, report further regressions de-
signed to test the robustness of these results. In column (2) of Table 4, experience 
is decomposed into its component parts of shipbuilding and engine building. Both 
are found to have similar effects on the hazard. Column (3) removes from the 
sample firms with unknown backgrounds. The measured effect of experience is 
not altered by the change in sample, although the estimate of λ has increased 
sufficiently that it is significant at the 10 percent level. Because experience may 
be more important in the early, experimental days of the industry, column (4) 
restricts the sample to firms entering after 1875. Experience continues to matter 
as strongly as before, and age continues to have no impact on the hazard. 
  Table 5 reports additional regressions that allow for three piecewise constant 
effects for experience at different ages and adds a further control for size, cumula-
tive output. First, consistent with the Cox regressions of Table 3, there is no evi-
dence that the effects of experience decay with firm age. In fact, the effect of pre- 
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entry experience on the exit hazard is even greater for firms over 20 years of age 
than it is for firms under 10 years of age, and these results are obtained despite 
the inclusion of several controls for size. Second, this alternative treatment of 
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These results are unchanged regardless of whether one includes or excludes firms 
with unknown prior experience, or whether one restricts the sample to post-1875 
entrants. 
D. Monte Carlo simulation of missing data. 
  The 70 firms with unknown backgrounds performed worse than any other 
group. It is likely that the majority of these firms were inexperienced, not only 
because they performed poorly, but also because their absence from the hundreds 
of shipbuilding and county histories, city almanacs, and biographical compendi-
ums consulted during data collection suggests that the firms and their founders 
had not previously been active in any related business. Nonetheless, it is also 
likely that some of these firms were experienced, and have just fallen through the 
cracks. If a sufficient number of them were experienced, the missing data will 
have led us to exaggerate the effect of pre-entry experience.  
  In this section, I report the results of a simulation exercise that assesses the 
extent to which the missing data could account for the reported results. The 
simulation imagines what could be considered a worst case scenario, namely that 
the firms with missing data were just as likely to be experienced as the firms for 
which data are available. To implement this, each of the 70 firms with unknown 
background was assigned at random to either the foundry, experienced, or miscel-
laneous groups with probabilities equal to the proportion of each of these three 
groups found in the data. The hazard regression from column (1) of Table 4 is 
then run with these artificial assignments of firms. 
  Figure 9 plots the estimated hazard ratios for EXPERIENCE obtained from 
1,000 replications of this exercise. The mean hazard ratio is 0.65, compared with 
0.53 in Table 4, and only one estimate in the 1,000 runs exceeds 0.80. Figure 9 
also reports the significance levels: 76 percent of the estimates are significant at 
the five percent level or greater, and fully 95 percent of the estimates are signifi-
cant at the ten percent level or greater. By any reasonable standard, the  
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simulation results clearly show that the effect on survival of pre-entry experience 
is not driven by missing data. 
V. Conclusions 
  A number of complex theories of firm performance can explain the well-known 
observation that survival is negatively related to age, but all of them exploit the 
idea that age serves as a proxy for an omitted variable. However, a more mun-
dane explanation – selection bias driven by variations in firm quality – may also 
underlie the phenomenon. Using new data for the US iron and steel shipbuilding 
industry, this paper has presented the results of a simple test to discriminate be-
























FIGURE 9. Estimated hazard ratio for experience from random assignment of
firms with unknown backgrounds to experienced and inexperienced firms,
1,000 replications. Regression specification is identical to column (1) of Table
4. Arrow indicates point estimate from column (1) of Table 4.  
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found that the age-dependency observed in the data can be explained by selection 
bias, leaving nothing for the more complex theories to explain.  
  Assuming these results apply more generally
18, they suggest that complex 
theories to explain the size-conditional effects of age on firm survival may well be 
barking up the wrong tree. Instead, simple models of firm performance may well 
be consistent with the evidence on age-dependency. For example, in Hopenhayn’s 
(1992) model of exit driven by exogenous productivity shocks, age has no effect 
on the exit hazard after conditioning on size. However, the simple addition of 
some fixed firm effects – either in the variance of the productivity shocks, or the 
sensitivity of firm profitability to the shocks – are sufficient to make the model 
consistent with the evidence presented in this paper.  
  This paper used the pre-entry backgrounds of firms as a proxy for firm qual-
ity. It was found that relevant pre-entry experience has large effects on survival, 
that the effects showed no tendency to diminish as firms gained post-entry ex-
perience, and that they were not diminished by controlling for firm size. The ob-
served persistence of experience effects is inconsistent with traditional rationaliza-
tions of why experienced firms may outperform inexperienced firms. On the con-
trary, the evidence suggests that the circumstances surrounding a firm’s birth 
permanently conditions what it does throughout its life. Moreover, this persis-
tence matters for policy. As Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2002) point out, while 
a government may readily intervene to alter current conditions, there is little it 
can do to change ex post the historical circumstances surrounding a firm’s birth. 
Consequently, they argue, greater attention should be directed toward the devel-
                                                           
18 Some features of the shipbuilding industry, notably the absence of a shakeout, distinguish it from 
some of the more frequently studied episodes in US manufacturing history (e.g. the automobile in-
dustry), and more work needs to be done to replicate the findings of this paper in other industries. 
But the early signs are that what distinguishes shipbuilding from industries where scale economies 
might be more important will not be a factor in the results. In the US automobile industry, where 
dynamic scale economies appear to be central to understanding the industry’s evolution, Klepper 
(2003) has found that controlling for a firm’s background can all but eliminate the effect of age 
even without controls for size.  
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opment of appropriate neonatal policies. 
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